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Smart and Dangerous: How Cognitive Skills Drive the 
Intergenerational Transmission of Retaliation 
 
A need exists to understand how people develop an aggressive, retaliatory conflict resolution 
policy vs. a more passive reconciliation stance. I contribute a choice-theoretic model that 
explains how cognitive skills drive the transmission of conflict resolution policies. A child’s 
resolution policy depends on parental effort and the influence of the outside environment. 
The model has the implication that high-cognitive parents socialize children to their conflict 
resolution culture more successfully than parents with low cognitive skills. Indeed, I test the 
model using the cognitive skills and conflict resolution skills of parents and children from the 
UK National Childhood Development Survey. I find that the parent’s effort is reinforced by the 
prevalence of their conflict resolution values in society. The data confirm that children of 
retaliating high-cognitive parents are more likely to be socialized to that resolution culture 
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 1. Introduction
A need exists to understand how people adopt an aggressive retaliation stance vs. a
passive reconciliation stance when an o⁄ense arises.1 The con￿ ict resolution stance
one adopts when interacting with others ￿ts into the broader category of socioemotional
skills. Economic research continues to document the importance of noncognitive, or
socioemotional, skills. These skills a⁄ect adult outcomes as strongly as cognitive skills
(Heckman and Carneiro [2003]). I ￿nd that cognitive skills are not particularly associated
with a retaliation or a reconciliation approach to con￿ ict, and I show that socioemotional
skills are more malleable than cognitive skills.
For these reasons, I believe the shaping of socioemotional skills deserves increased
attention, and I contribute a choice-theoretic model which explains the development of,
or ￿socialization" to, a certain socioemotional skill. I focus on a new dimension of
socialization: the outcome of a retaliatory stance, or ￿culture," as it is commonly referred
to in the sociology literature. In the model, this outcome depends both on the in￿ uence of
the parent and the outside environment, which draws from the recent economic literature
on internal and external socialization spurred by Bisin and Verdier [2001]. Parents
evaluate the two available cultures with their own preferences. Consequently, parents
choose an e⁄ort level with which to teach children their own culture, believing it is the
￿right" one. In the model, relatively aggressive parents aim to socialize their children
to the aggressive retaliation culture. Less aggressive parents teach a forgiveness culture.
Finally, the parents￿cognitive ability a⁄ects the quality of their e⁄ort.
That said, the greater community also impacts the child￿ s outcome. In fact, this pa-
per departs from the recent cultural transmission literature (see Bisin, Topa, and Verdier
[2004], Patacchini and Zenou [2007]) by lending greater importance to the outside environ-
ment. In this setting, the parent￿ s e⁄ort cannot succeed without minimal reinforcement
1I will use the following words within brackets interchangeably: {forgiving, reconciling, passive, nonag-
gressive}, {aggressive, retaliatory}, {socioemotional culture, con￿ ict resolution culture, culture}.
1from society. In the previous literature, children could bump into peers, for example,
and become socialized to a culture di⁄erent than the one taught by their parents. A
distinguishing feature of the retaliation vs. forgiveness dimension is the added implica-
tions when these run-ins include con￿ icts. In a con￿ ict, a forgiving person faces a higher
probability of being retaliated against when more people are retaliators, even though the
forgiving person will forgive. In this sense, the presence of retaliating people yields a
negative externality for forgiving people. In the same way, the presence of forgiving peo-
ple results in a positive externality for retaliators. In a con￿ ict with a forgiving person, a
retaliator will not su⁄er punishment. Thus, the greater the presence of forgiving people
in society, the lower the probability a retaliating person will be retaliated against.
When the parent￿ s culture is more prominent in society, these externalities enhance
the e⁄ort of the parent, or ￿grease the wheels of indoctrination", so to speak. Persuading
a child to be forgiving is easier the lower the probability they will be retaliated against.
Similarly, convincing a child to adopt a retaliation policy is easier the more they feel they
will be retaliated against. The data support this complementarity between the parent￿ s
e⁄ort and the prominence of the parent￿ s culture in the outside environment.
I test the model with parent-child records in the UK National Childhood Develop-
ment Survey (NCDS). Parent￿ s socialization e⁄ort is a strong determinant of the child￿ s
cultural outcome. I also ￿nd that parental e⁄ort is enhanced by the prevalence of the
parent￿ s culture in society. Cognition a⁄ects this process. In particular, when an ag-
gressive culture is more prominent in society, high-cognitive aggressive parents increase
their e⁄ort investment less than low-cognitive aggressive parents, yet the probability that
an aggressive parent successfully socializes the child to an aggressive retaliation culture
increases more for a high-cognitive parent than for a low-cognitive parent.
I now provide evidence of the need to reshape resolution cultures and that con￿ ict
resolution skills are more malleable than cognitive skills. This lends an opportunity for
parents and society to intervene.
22. Opportunity to Reshape Resolution Cultures
A certain degree of aggression is necessary to commit a violent act. The young U.S. pop-
ulation is actually shrinking, yet violent crimes attributed to this age group are increasing
(See Chart 1).
Chart 1
I ￿nd, however that aggressive behavior during youth can change. Furthermore, it is
important to know that aggression is more pliant than cognitive skills.
A set of transition matrices for positions in the distribution of cognitive skill and
aggression, respectively, provides this insight (See Tables 1, 2).2 The probability of a
child remaining in the same part of the cognitive skill distribution is over .70 for every
level of cognitive skills. In contrast, those with more aggression initially do move to
di⁄erent points in the distribution of aggression with high probability. In addition, it
is not possible to rise to the top of the cognitive skill distribution if one started at the
bottom. It is also impossible to fall to the bottom of the cognitive skill distribution if
one started at the top. This is not true for aggression. Half the people who start out as
2Cognitive skills are measured by math and reading standardized tests. Groups in Table 2 re￿ ect
the degree of aggression exhibited in the child￿ s behavior. See Section 5.1 for a detailed description of
aggression.
3highly aggressive move to a point of low aggression. In addition, one-￿fth of those who
start with low aggression become highly aggressive.
Cognitive Group at Age 16 ￿!
Lo C Mid C Hi C
Group Lo C 0.72 0.28 0.00
at Mid C 0.13 0.74 0.13
Age 11 Hi C 0.00 0.27 0.73
Source: Author￿ s tabulation of NCDS.
Table 1: Transitions in the Distribution of Cognitive Skills
Aggression Group at Age 16 ￿!
Lo A Mid A Hi A
Group Lo A 0.76 0.04 0.20
at Mid A 0.73 0.09 0.17
Age 11 Hi A 0.53 0.16 0.31
Source: Author￿ s tabulation of NCDS.
Table 2: Transitions in the Distribution of Aggression
Less stickiness in the evolution of aggression relative to that of cognitive skills suggests
an opportunity to in￿ uence the former. I now propose a theory for the active shaping of
socioemotional skills in children which is driven by ￿xed cognitive skills of their parents.
3. A Theory of Socioemotional Skill Transmission
3.1 Setting
There are two generations, parent and child. Parents, the only active players, decide on a
time allocation of (Labor, Leisure, Child Rearing). Their payo⁄is the sum of (1) present
4utility from income, leisure, and child rearing e⁄ort and (2) the future utility of children.
Parents evaluate con￿ ict resolution approaches with their own preferences. Thus,
they believe their way is the ￿right" way and that their children will be better o⁄ if they
have the same culture as they do. Ultimately, the culture of the parent determines the
cultural content of the e⁄ort they exert. Retaliation is one type of culture represented in
this phrase: ￿Fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth; whatever injury he has
given a person shall be given to him." Forgiveness, the other culture, rejects this type of
resolution: ￿You have heard that it was said, ￿ An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth￿ :
But I say to you, ... if anyone slaps you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also."
The culture of retaliation has aggressive undertones, while a culture of forgiveness
necessitates a degree of nonaggression. Aggressive parents use the child rearing time to
teach ￿an eye for an eye." Nonaggressive parents spend their child rearing time instilling
￿turn the other cheek." This time investment cultivates the aggression (nonaggression)
necessary for children to adopt the retaliation (forgiveness) culture.3
The share of society allied with the parent￿ s culture enhances the parent￿ s e⁄ort. Suc-
cessful socialization requires some reinforcement from the outside environment. Social-
izing children to be forgiving has greater sway the lower the probability they will con￿ ict
with a retaliating person. Similarly, convincing children to retaliate is easier the greater
the potential of being a victim of retaliation.
Finally, the e⁄ort of high cognitive skill parents is considered higher quality. Otherwise
stated, high-cognitive parents are better teachers.
3An assumption, is that although the parent￿ s e⁄ort in￿ uences socioemotional skills, the child does
not react to the plain fact that the parent has made an e⁄ort; there is no rebellion or pleasing.
53.2 Model
3.2.1 Skill Sets
The two levels of cognitive skills (c) are High (H) and Low (L), c 2 fH;Lg. There are two
types (i) of socioemotional cultures: Forgiving-Passive (P) and Retaliatory-Aggressive
(A), i 2 fA;Pg.
The exogenous share of people outside the home environment (e.g. school, neighbor-
hood) with Retaliatory-Aggressive skills is q 2 [0;1].
3.2.2 Socialization Probabilities to a Con￿ ict Resolution Culture
Parents use their e⁄ort-time, ei 2 [0;1], to in￿ uence the child￿ s cultural outcome. Recall
that the e⁄ort of low cognitive skill parents is discounted by ￿ 2 [0;1). The probability
that a parent with socioemotional culture i and cognitive skill level c will have a child
that develops socioemotional culture i is ￿i









The equations above re￿ ect that an aggressive parent￿ s success probability depends
on their e⁄ort eA, which is complemented by the prevalence of their beliefs in the outside
environment.4 ￿A
AH > ￿A
AL implies that aggressive high cognitive skill parents ￿win" more
frequently than their low cognitive skill counterparts for a given level of e⁄ort.
The socialization probabilities for passive parents are similar:
￿
P




PL = (1 ￿ q)￿e
P (4)
4￿P
Ac = 1 ￿ ￿A
Ac
6A passive parent￿ s success is a function of their e⁄ort level enhanced by the degree to
which the child￿ s sphere of in￿ uence shares the same culture.5 ￿P
PH > ￿P
PL again re￿ ects
the higher quality e⁄ort of high cognitive skill parents.
3.2.3 Utility




i is leisure time. Total time is normalized to 1, thus ￿
i = 1 ￿ ei.
The cost of e⁄ort, ￿(e), is utility from leisure:
￿(e) = ￿U(1 ￿ e).
I assume that the marginal cost of e⁄ort is positive,
￿
0(e) = U




00(1 ￿ e) > 0.
A type i parent￿ s perception of the future utility for a type i child is W i
i.6 Again,
parents believe that children will be better o⁄ if they have the same culture as they do:
W i
i > W i
j. The future utility of the child enters into the parent￿ s expected utility. I
normalize W i
j to 0, and W i
i is the incremental utility from having a ￿like" child. For
simplicity, the weights on present utility and the child￿ s future utility are equal.
5￿A
Pc = 1 ￿ ￿P
Pc
6For simplicity I consider future utility from socioemotional culture only. This is the only relevant
aspect of utility in the parents￿optimization decision as they cannot change cognitive skills.
73.3 Choosing E⁄ort Level
Aggressive and passive parents maximize expected utility
EV
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H = 1 and ￿
L = ￿.






A = 0 (8)
￿U
0(1 ￿ e
P) + (1 ￿ q)￿
cW
P
P = 0 (9)
De￿ning ￿ = [U0]￿1, the optimal e⁄ort levels are7:
e
A￿


















7The assumption ￿00(e) > 0 implies U00(￿) < 0, which ensures a maximum.
￿ > 0;￿0 < 0:













The aggressive parent￿ s optimal e⁄ort level increases as the outside environment be-





@q = ￿0 ￿
￿






I interpret the implications for passive parents in terms of the population share that
is passive (1 ￿ q). The greater the share of passive people in the sphere of in￿ uence, the







@q depends on assumptions concerning the sign of
U000, which determines whether ￿0 [￿] is decreasing or increasing. I refrain from making an
assumption, but I will test the relative magnitudes of the
@ei￿
c
@q in the data.
Proposition 2
(i) For aggressive parents the probability their child will have aggressive socioemo-




(ii) For passive parents the probability that their child will have passive socioemotional
skills is: ￿P







When the proportion of society practicing retaliation increases, the probability of an
aggressive cultural outcome increases. This arises through the direct e⁄ect of q on the
outcome probability and the indirect e⁄ect of q increasing e⁄ort.





When the outside environment is more aligned with a retaliation culture, a passive
parent is less likely to have a child that adopts a forgiveness culture. This is the result of
the direct e⁄ect of q and because an increase in q also causes passive parents to decrease
their e⁄ort. Equivalently, when more of society subscribes to a forgiveness culture, the







@q also depends on assumptions concerning the






@q respectively. Again, these
relative magnitudes are testable.
5. Testing the Model￿ s Implications
A number of testable implications are presented in the Propositions above. Testing
requires suitable measures of q, e, and skill type (c , i) for parents and children. I use
the UK NCDS panel survey. The ￿rst three waves include interviews of a birth cohort
(Generation 1) and the parents of the cohort members (Generation 0). In the ￿fth wave,
the children of the cohort members (Generation 2) are also interviewed. For the empirical
application, Generation 1 maps to ￿parents" from the theoretical model and Generation
2 maps to ￿children" in the theoretical model.
5.1 Identifying Cultural Alignment
5.1.1 Parents and Children
Parents in Generation 0 identify their children (Generation 1) as aggressive or nonaggres-
sive using the same rubric as Parents in Generation 1 later use to classify their children
(Generation 2):
10...indicate for each one whether this description certainly applies, applies
somewhat or does not apply to your child
1)He/She often destroys own or others￿property.
2)He/She frequently ￿ghts or is quarrelsome with other children.
3)He/She bullies other children.
4)He/She is irritable and is quick to ￿￿y o⁄ the handle￿ .
The socioemotional skills of both generations are extracted from the responses of their
respective parents. Those in Generation 1 and 2 with an aggressive culture are those
for whom the behaviors above apply somewhat or certainly. A concern might be a bias
in the responses of parents. The same questions are asked of both the parents and the
teachers of Generation 1. The responses of parents and teachers are positively correlated.
5.1.2 Outside Environment
The exogenous share of people in a child￿ s environment, or sphere of in￿ uence, who display
an aggressive culture is q. The empirical counterpart is lagged 17 years. People in the
outside environment with an aggressive culture are those for whom the following behaviors
apply somewhat or certainly:
1)He/She often destroys own or others￿property.
2)He/She frequently ￿ghts or is quarrelsome with other children.
3)He/She bullies other children.
4)He/She is irritable and is quick to ￿￿y o⁄ the handle￿ .
The outside environment is de￿ned as one of 11 geographical areas. The share of those
with an aggressive culture (q) is shown by area9 :
9The areas are admittedly large, however institutional restrictions prevent access to greater geographic
detail at present.
11Table 3: The Share of Aggressive People by Area
Area N q
North 869 0.21
North West 1471 0.18
E. & W. Riding 882 0.18
North Midlands 872 0.16
Midlands 1129 0.16
South West 763 0.16
East 981 0.15





This geographical interpretation has to at least show di⁄erences in q to a⁄ect e⁄ort
and socialization outcomes. Table 4 shows that this measure of q di⁄ers statistically by
area:
12Table 4: The Prominence of Aggression (q) Di⁄ers Statistically by Area
Geo. Area !
#
North NW EWR NM M E SE S SW W Sct
North ￿
North West ** ￿
E & W Riding * ￿
N. Midlands *** ￿
Midlands *** ￿
East *** * ￿
South East *** ** ** ￿
South *** *** *** ** ** ** ** ￿
South West *** ** ￿
Wales *** ** * ￿
Scotland *** ** ** ** ￿
Source: Author￿ s Tabulations of NCDS.
Note: ***,**,* denote signi￿cance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively
135.2 Cognitive Skills
The cognitive skills of parents play a role in the model. Cognitive skills are assumed
to increase the impact of the parents￿e⁄ort to socialize children. Such cognitive skills
are measured by achievements on standardized math and reading tests administered by
the NCDS to interviewees. One may question whether cognitive skills are exogenous to
retaliatory or reconciliatory behavior. This does not seem to be a real concern, however.
Those exhibiting an aggressive culture fall into the same median quartile of cognitive
achievement as those in the forgiving culture. The di⁄erence in the mean quartile of
cognitive achievement is small: 2.7 for retaliatory people vs. 2.9 for forgiving ones. For
this speci￿c set of socioemotional skills, cognitive skills do not appear endogenous.
5.3 E⁄ort
The time parents spend teaching a con￿ ict resolution culture is unobserved and therefore
proxied by other responses. Given a culture, the proxies measure the intensity of this
culture in the parent￿ s reaction to a negative experience with their child. I thereby
assume that the type of culture the parents teach their children is also the type of culture
the parents use to teach their children. These proxies are also justi￿ed if children learn
from the way they are taught.
For aggressive parents, the following questions serve as proxies for their e⁄ort to so-
cialize their children to retaliation:
I. If your child brought home a report with mark or comments lower than
expected, how likely would you be tell him/her o⁄?
II. If your child brought home a report with mark or comments lower than
expected, how likely would you be to punish him/her?
Not at all Likely Very Likely
1 2 3 4 5
14For passive parents the following are proxies for their e⁄ort to socialize their children
to reconciliation:
III. If your child brought home a report with mark or comments lower than
expected, how likely would you be to wait and see if he/she improves on own?
IV. If your child brought home a report with mark or comments lower than
expected, how likely would you be to talk with him/her?
Not at all Likely Very Likely
1 2 3 4 5
Though questions I-IV are asked of all parents, it is meaningful that the aggressive
parents do not employ tactics in questions III and IV. Similarly, passive parents do not
employ tactics in questions I and II. 10
5.4 Joint Estimation of E⁄ort and Cultural Outcome
5.4.1 Speci￿cation
Proposition 1 treated the relationship between parental time investment and the in￿ uence
of the outside environment. A parent￿ s e⁄ort, ei, is modeled as a linear function of the
prominence of aggression in the outside culture, q, in region of residence, r, and other
control variables:
10This also speaks to the issue of parents perhaps having changed their culture later in life. Recall,
the last time I observe socioemotional skills is at age 16. The fact that people identi￿ed as aggressive
at age 16 also display aggressive behavior later with their children provides some weak evidence that
socioemotional skills may become stickier with age, though they are highly malleable at younger ages.
That said it may be possible that initially aggressive people remain aggressive with their children, but
not in other areas. If this were true, the inability to control for it would cause the variables of interest to
appear less e⁄ective than they truly are.
15e
i
n = ￿qr + ￿zn +
￿ !
￿ ￿ ! x n + "n. (12)
Implications for the socialization probabilities presented in Proposition 2 can also be
tested. The ￿i
i are modeled as a linear function of q, ei, and other control variables:
￿
i
in = ￿1qr + ￿2e
i
n + ￿3(qr ￿ e
i
n) + ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ! x n + ￿n. (13)
The e⁄ort variable, ei
n, is equal to 1 if a parent is more likely than the median parent (in
that con￿ ict resolution culture) to practice the behaviors in the respective proxy questions
and 0 otherwise. ￿i
in is equal to 1 if the child exhibits the same culture as the parent and
0 otherwise.
5.4.2 Identi￿cation
Because "n and ￿n may be correlated, I estimate (12) and (13) jointly by Maximum Like-
lihood in a bivariate probit speci￿cation. The model is identi￿ed if one or more variables
in (12) predict a parent￿ s e⁄ort but do not cause the child￿ s cultural outcome. This
variable is represented by z in (12), and is excluded from (13). The child￿ s age at which
the mother stops breast feeding and whether the child was breast-fed are signi￿cantly
correlated with e⁄ort, but do not cause any factors that cause the child￿ s socioemotional
culture. Table 5 reports these relationships.
16Table 5: Exclusion Restriction
Retaliating1 Forgiving
Age Breast Was Child
Feeding Stopped Breastfed




Male Child -0.0009 0.0295
(0.0011) (0.0384)
" No. of Children -0.0027 0.0831
(0.0022) (0.0663)
x Income -0.1649 -0.0904
(0.4342) (0.5428)




Note: Robust std. errors. ** Signi￿cant at 5% level
1Read: Among retaliating parents the age at which they stopped breastfeeding
is a predictor of their e⁄ort, but not of the frequency of alcohol consumption, etc.
176. Results
In the model, a parent￿ s e⁄ort increases the probability that the child will have the
same socioemotional culture as the parent. The estimates are performed conditional on
the cognitive skills of the parent. The following summarizes the success of the e⁄ort
proxies11:




@e > 0 P*** .21
@￿A
AL
@e > 0 P*** .23
@￿P
PH
@e < 0 P*** .45
@￿P
PL
@e < 0 P*** .40
A parent exerting more e⁄ort has a large marginal impact on the probability of the
child adopting the parent￿ s socioemotional culture. The model did not have any implica-
tions for the relative e⁄ect of passive parents vs. aggressive parents, but the data suggest
that the e⁄ort of passive parents has about twice the impact.
The tests of the model￿ s implications are summarized below. Though I do not ￿nd
signi￿cant e⁄ects, the data support all but one of the implications. The greater the
proportion of society that shares the parent￿ s culture, the more e⁄ort the parent makes.
In addition, when the parent￿ s culture is more prominent, the probability that their child
adopts their culture increases, with the exception of aggressive low-cognitive parents.
Finally, I test the role of cognitive skills. The data tell an interesting story. Though all
parents increase their e⁄ort when society is more aligned with their values, high cognitive
parents increase their e⁄ort less than low cognitive parents. This is intuitive because the
e⁄ort of high cognitive parents is of higher quality.
11See Appendix 2 for the Maximum Likelihood estimations.




@q > 0 P
@eA￿
L
@q > 0 P
@eP￿
H
@q < 0 P
@eP￿
L
@q < 0 P
@￿AA
H
@q > 0 P
@￿AA
L
@q > 0 F
@￿PP
H
@q < 0 P
@￿PP
L
@q < 0 P
Although high cognitive parents increase their e⁄ort investment by less when their
culture is more prominent, the probability that the child￿ s cultural outcome is the same
as the parent￿ s increases more for the high-cognitive parent than the low-cognitive par-
ent. Speci￿cally, when retaliation is more prevalent in a region, high-cognitive aggressive
parents experience even greater additional success. Similarly, high-cognitive forgiving
parents ￿lose" less frequently when retaliation is more pronounced in the local culture.





































￿ ￿ ￿ P***
197. Conclusion
Demonstrably, a parent￿ s e⁄ort strongly determines a child￿ s con￿ ict resolution culture.
The environment has a certain in￿ uence as well, but in a dynamic setting, parental e⁄ort
can drive the culture of the environment. Though both resolution cultures examined in
this study are psychologically justi￿able, the consequences of adopting one policy over
the other are drastically di⁄erent depending on the social context.
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c = U(1 ￿ eA) + [q￿
ceA]W A
A
F:O:C : ￿U0(1 ￿ eA) + q￿
cW A
A = 0
U0(1 ￿ eA) > 0
S:O:C : ￿U00(1 ￿ eA) < 0 from the assumption on ￿00(e):
22U0(1 ￿ eA) = q￿
cW A
A
De￿ne ￿ = [U0]￿1: ￿[￿] > 0;￿0[￿] < 0:
1 ￿ eA = ￿[q￿
cW A
A]























c = U(1 ￿ eP)+ [(1 ￿ q)￿
ceP]W P
P
F:O:C : ￿U0(1 ￿ eP) + (1 ￿ q)￿
cW P
P = 0
U0(1 ￿ eP) > 0
S:O:C : ￿U00(1 ￿ eP) < 0 from the assumption on ￿00(e):
U0(1 ￿ eP) = (1 ￿ q)￿
cW P
P
1 ￿ eP = ￿[(1 ￿ q)￿
cW P
P ];￿ = [U0]￿1




































































Table 9: Socialization to Retaliation (Joint ML)
Stage 1 Dependent Var: e⁄ort eA N=174 N=230





Stage 2 Dependent Var: ￿AA





Note: Robust std. errors are in parentheses.
24Table 10: Socialization to Reconciliation (Joint ML)
Stage 1 Dependent Var: e⁄ort eP N=569 N=430





Stage 2 Dependent Var: ￿PP





Note: Robust std. errors are in parentheses.
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